Federal regulators characterize capital forbearance as an efficient way of nursing weak banks and thrifts back to health. An alternative hypothesis is that forbearance reflects inefficient costs of agency that fall on federal deposit-insurance funds. Divergences between regulatory measures of a...

We examine the long-run relationship between market value, book value, and residual income in the Ohlson (Contemp Acc Res 11(2):661–687, <CitationRef CitationID="CR27">1995</CitationRef>) model. In particular, we test if market value is cointegrated with book value and residual income in light of their non-stationary behaviors. We find...</citationref>

The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their “sequential servicing constraint” to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing...