Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...

Tijs et al. [23] introduce the family of obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems. We give a generalization of such family. We prove that our family coincides with the set of rules satisfying an additivity property and a cost monotonicity property. We also provide two new...

Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...

We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to...

We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to...