It is known that the incompleteness of asset markets causes inefficiency in almost every equilibrium. Yet unexplored is the "size" of this inefficiency. The size of a Pareto improvement is the total willingness to pay for it, out of current consumption. Inefficiency is the maximum size of any...

A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies...

A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies...

A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies...

When asset markets are incomplete there are almost always many Pareto improving policy interventions. Remarkably, these interventions do not involve adding any new markets. Focusing on tax policy, I create a framework for proving the existence of Pareto improving taxes, for computing them, and...

When asset markets are incomplete there are almost always many Pareto improving policy interventions, provided there are multiple commodities and households. Remarkably, these interventions do not involve adding any new markets. Focusing on tax policy, I create a framework for proving the...