We consider a finite two-player zero-sum game with vector-valued rewards. We study the question of whether a given polyhedral set D is "approachable," that is, whether Player 1 (the "decision maker") can guarantee that the long-term average reward belongs to D, for any strategy of Player 2 (the...

We consider a finite-state, finite-action, infinite-horizon, discounted reward Markov decision process and study the bias and variance in the value function estimates that result from empirical estimates of the model parameters. We provide closed-form approximations for the bias and variance,...

Regret minimization in repeated matrix games has been extensively studied ever since Hannan's seminal paper [Hannan, J., 1957. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. In: Dresher, M., Tucker, A.W., Wolfe, P. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. III. Ann. of Math. Stud., vol....

We propose simple randomized strategies for sequential prediction under imperfect monitoring, that is, when the forecaster does not have access to the past outcomes but rather to a feedback signal. The proposed strategies are consistent in the sense that they achieve, asymptotically, the best...

We provide yet another proof of the existence of calibrated forecasters; it has two merits. First, it is valid for an arbitrary finite number of outcomes. Second, it is short and simple and it follows from a direct application of Blackwell's approachability theorem to carefully chosen...

Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-50).

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on...

We show that when a one-supplier/one-newsvendor supply chain is capacity-constrained, wholesale price contracts have some flexibility in allocating the channel-optimal profit. We analyze how this flexibility changes as we change the supply chain׳s capacity constraint and market demand. We also...

Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41).