Can the world be made more peaceful through commerce? Empirical studies of the impact of trade on military conflict have yielded conflicting results depending on the specific measures and empirical domains that scholars select for their studies. The article suggests that these varying results...

Drawing on Clausewitz's classical theory, we argue that the emergence of mass nationalism following the French Revolution profoundly altered the nature of the units constituting the interstate system, thereby transforming the conduct of interstate warfare. To validate these assertions—and thus...

Despite significant advances in the disaggregation of the study of civil conflict and intra-ethnic violence, intra-ethnic violence remains understudied. In this article, we present the first systematic, cross-national analysis of the conditions that promote violent, fragmentary conflict within...

In this article, it is argued that interstate alliances function as public costly signals of state intentions to cooperate militarily, and as such, they should be expected to influence state expectations within dyads, between dyads, and across time. Accurate statistical modeling of interstate...

This two volume set presents many of the most important articles on the reciprocal effects of the international system (both its political-economic and political-military attributes) and the domestic political and economic structures of the states that compose that system.

India's experience with the international computer industry serves as a key test of the “bargaining school” and the “Marxist-dependencia school” on relations between developing countries and multinational enterprises. India changed (and improved) its performance over time in...

The newest liberal institutionalism asserts that, although it accepts a major realist proposition that international anarchy impedes cooperation among states, it can nevertheless affirm the central tenets of the liberal institutionalist tradition that states can achieve cooperation and that...

Otherwise powerful, formidable democracies are tempting targets for international violence because they have leaders who, on average, have been in office for shorter periods of time than leaders of autocracies. Domestic incentives may make resistance more costly than offering concessions for...