We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency. For the...

We define and study transparency, credibility and reputation in a model where the central bank’s characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank,...

We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less...

The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (without such base drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible...

This paper is a selective survey of new or recent methods to extract information about market expectations from asset prices for monetary policy purposes. Traditionally, interest rates and forward exchange rates have been used to extract expected means of future interest rates, exchange rates...

An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation....

Price level targeting (without base drift) and inflation targeting (with base drift) are compared with persistence in output (generated by sticky prices, for instance). Counter to conventional wisdom, price level targeting results in lower short-run inflation variability than inflation targeting...

The so-called P* model is frequently used or referred to in discussions of monetary targeting. This gives the impression that the P* model might provide some rationale for monetary targeting or for the monetary reference value used by the Eurosystem. The P* model implies that inflation is...

The paper examines the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in an open economy with and without a binding zero bound on nominal interest rates. In particular, a foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap is suggested, consisting of a price-level target path, a devaluation of the...

Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconometric model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit 'instrument rules' as well as 'targeting rules'. The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to...