This discussion paper led to a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002251931400397X">'Journal of Theoretical Biology'</A>, 2014, 360, 279-289.<P> A widespread claim in evolutionary theory is that every group selection model can be recast in terms of inclusive fitness. Although there are interesting classes of group selection models for...</p></a>

This short paper focusses on an apparent conflict between two results from different approaches to the problem of finding multilateral index numbers. The impossibility theorem of Van Veelen (2002) is an axiomatic result that rules out the existence of a multilateral index that satisfies four...

In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be...

This paper is an effort to convince the reader that using a stochastic stage game in a repeated setting - rather than a deterministic one - comes with many advantages. The first is that as a game it is more realistic to assume that payoffs in future games are uncertain. The second is that it...

We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person's payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects...

We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person's payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects...

Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

For games in which there is no evolutionarily stable strategy, it can be useful to look for neutrally stable ones. In extensive form games for instance there is typically no evolutionary stable strategy, while there may very well be a neutrally stable one. Such strategies can however still be...

Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we deal with the question whether and when static concepts like evolutionary stability can shed any light on what happens in the dynamical context of a population playing these games. The continuous equivalents of theorems for the finite case...