In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies of overlapping generations. With respect to the established body of results in the literature, we allow for sequentially incomplete markets and we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons, by...

In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies of overlapping generations under possibly sequentially incomplete markets. With respect to the established body of results in the literature, we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons, by...

In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies ofoverlapping generations under possibly sequentially incomplete markets. With respect to the established body of results in the literature, we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons,by considering...

We introduce notions of increasingness for the best reply of a game that capture properly the intuitive idea of complementarity among players’ strategies. We show, by generalizing the fixpoint theorems of Veinott and Zhou, that the Nash sets of our games with increasing best replies are...

I provide a complete characterization of equilibrium with risk of default in sequential economies under uncertainty. Default induces permanent exclusion from financial markets and not-too-tight solvency constraints prevent debt repudiation at equilibrium. The method of analysis relies on a...

In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform ine±ciency, corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources (Debreu [11]). I provide necessary and su±cient conditions for uniform ine±ciency in terms of...

In this paper, we consider economies with (possibly endogenous) solvency constraints under uncertainty. Constrained ine±ciency corresponds to a feasible redistribution yielding a welfare improvement beginning from ev- ery contingency reached by the economy. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10])...

We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann [3]). In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in...