The note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are note ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that...

In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an...

We characterize the boundaries of the set of transfers (extremal transfers) implementing a given allocation rule without imposing any assumptions on the agentʼs type space or utility function besides quasi-linearity. Exploiting the concept of extremal transfers allows us to obtain an exact...

Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource extraction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) when the donor prefers contracting with central rather than local governments, and (iv) how the donor’s presence may induce institutional change....

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...

In this paper, individuals, initially living in a Mirrleesian economy A, have outside options consisting in settling down in a laissez-faire country B while paying positive migration costs. We first examine the impact of the threat of migration, assuming participation constraints are taken into...

This paper makes two contributions in the context of seller-buyer relationships with bilateral relationship-specific investment. Firstly, we demonstrate how ex-post negotiations via double auctions can be used to alleviate and often resolve the hold-up problem. Secondly, we show that ex-post...

This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an ex post outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without ex post outside options, the optimal contract is...

We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of...

First, this article uses standard welfare economics to illustrate the market failure and policy coordination problems caused by transboundary pollution problems in general and global warming in particular. Secondly, a brief overview is given of the main results obtained by empirical modelling...