A standard assumption in the economic approach to individual decision making is that people have independent preferences. We study equilibria of the classic common pool resource extraction and public good games when some of the players have negatively interdependent preferences while the...

We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoofs. Specially, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not only about their own...

Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case...

We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not only about their own...

A standard assumption in the economic approach to individual decision making is that people have independent preferences, that is, they care only about their absolute (material) payoffs. We study equilibria of the classic common pool resource extraction and public good games when some of the...

The variance of logarithms is a widely used inequality measure which is well known to disagree with the Lorenz criterion. Up to now, the extent and likelihood of this inconsistency were thought to be vanishingly small. We find that this view is mistaken : the extent of the disgreement can be...