market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status …We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the …, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a …

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

This paper analyses the market for professional (expert) services where the experts are motivated by reputational … characteristics can induce clients to choose between experts with different reputations. The paper shows that clients choices have an … important impact on the incentives of experts to provide a high quality service. In particular, sorting of clients affects …

his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …

his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be … angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger Informationsvermittler legt. Dabei kann gezeigt …