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personal cost, for the violation of a widely-held norm (for example, don’t free ride). Social reciprocity differs from … reciprocity because social reciprocators punish all norm violators, regardless of group affiliation or whether or not the punisher … intervention. To understand this phenomenon, we define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating ones disapproval, at some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196526
altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of …We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of … widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823004
people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best. We also show that social reciprocity can evolve in a … each theory and se behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190078
report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and … group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822220
report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and … group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636286
nature. We discuss the forces that would have acted for and against the evolution of this ability for a large class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011211971
В статье определены институциональные рамки организационной культуры. С позиций "теории идеологии" исследованы возможные пути формирования института...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011238872
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970523
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal return to the public good and type of game. The marginal return is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The 'standard' game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859420
for in-group members may counteract this effect. We test this model with a lab experiment. With homogeneous in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271636