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Empirical Analysis of Countervailing Power in Business-to-Business Bargaining
Beckert, Walter - Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics - 2011
bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical identification of countervailing power. Testable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369385
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Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
Jurdziak, Leszek - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom? Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837144
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List Prices, Bargaining and Resultant Productivity Diffusion Delay
Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005
List prices are not completely credible as take it or leave it prices: buyers are able to seek reductions by bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977849
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Bargaining Microfoundations for Productivity Dispersion
Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2006
This paper analyses the implications of bargaining between buyers and sellers on the competitive outcome in a … homogeneous good industry. Bargaining creates a competitive equilibrium in which some inefficient sellers coexist with efficient … price dispersion but transaction price uniformity. The bargaining models is not observationally equivalent to Bertrand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977892
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Partial collusion in an asymmetric duopoly
Villar, Marc Escrihuela - Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Facultat de Ciències … - 2012
In this paper we investigate the connection between cost asymmetries and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated Cournot duopoly. We assume that firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905516
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Cartel Formation with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty
Paha, Johannes - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2013
This article provides a framework for the analysis of cartel formation. It models the strategic interaction among firms who invest into production capacity, sell a near-homogeneous good, and are subject to unexpected demand shocks with persistence. The firms either compete or collude in prices....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958041
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Leading merger in a Stackelberg oligopoly: Profitability and consumer welfare
Liu, Chih-Chen; Wang, Leonard F.S. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 1-3
This paper examines the effects of obtaining a strategic advantage of becoming the leader in the market on insiders’ incentives to merge and consumer welfare. We show that being the market leader is privately profitable for the merging insiders. We also show that the leading merger would...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263415
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COLLUSION AND PRICE DISPERSION
Connor, John M. - Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University - 2004
While there are suggestions in applied cartel studies that price dispersion changes when cartelization of a market occurs, there are few theoretical or empirical analyses of this effect. This paper surveys the thin economic literature on the link between overt collusion and price dispersion....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248358
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’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy
Boone, Jan - Abteilung "Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller … - 2002
This paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game where firms can react to each others’ price changes before the customers arrive. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248553
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Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385360