In this paper we argue that the strategic interaction between the labor supply decision of the elderly and private transfers from their children lowers the opportunity cost of leisure of the elderly. This in turn magnifies the crowding-out effect of public pensions on the labor supply of the...

In this paper, I analyze the crowding-out effects of public transfers on labor supply of the elderly in the context of developing countries. I argue that the interactions between private transfers received and labor supplied by the elderly affect the opportunity cost of retirement and,...

We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants...

We study the effects of screening stringency in the Swedish sickness insurance system by exploiting a field experiment. The experiment was conducted on 270,000 individuals in two geographical areas with the treatment group randomized by date of birth. The screening of eligibility was reduced for...

The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day...

Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...

Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers' sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...

Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness- related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...

Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness- related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...