We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude.

We suppose the principal not only designs a mechanism, but can participate as a plyer. The result is a Bayesian model where one player, the pricipal has no information, and the remaining players have complete information.

In many countries of Asia, the Middle-East and Africa the average age at marriage of both men and women has been rising significantly, while the difference between the average marriage age of men and women has been declining. Moreover, marriage patterns display a form of dualism: educated men...