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We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012139
We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423112
Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce … resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions …-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570347
Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce … resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions …-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113889
revenue in case of trade. As an application we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions and demonstrate that … technique to compare the selling probabilities and revenues of posted prices and auctions and confirm our theoretical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010943338
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424
Procurement practices are affected by uncertainty regarding suppliers' costs, the nature of competition among suppliers, and uncertainty regarding possible collusion among suppliers. Buyers dissatisfied with bids of incumbent suppliers can cancel their procurements and resolicit bids after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011264247
This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370851
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be …, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher … consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015169