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Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information

Dietrich, Franz - EconWPA - 2004

investigate this question in case that the individual probability functions are based on different information sets. Under … any overlaps between different persons' information sets. The solutions are derived from an axiomatic system that models … parameter-free, and that they incorporate each individual's information although the individuals need not communicate their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412461

Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict.

Esteban, J.; Ray, D. - El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro … - 1999

In this short paper, we ask the following question: Why is lobbying so endemic in societies? Put another way, might it not be possible to design a social decision rule that assigns to each group its equilibrium probability of success, and sidestep the inefficient waste of resources that results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776879

The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations.

Perry, M.; Vincent, D.R. - University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics - 1996

We illustrate by means of a dynamic research and development race that, while at some points in the race, social incentives and private incentives may coincide, at other points they may diverge-- too many researchers remain that race.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812632

Collective Action and Group Size Paradox.

Esteban, J.; Ray, D. - El Instituto de Estudios Economicos de Galicia Pedro … - 1999

The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478567

A Model of Expertise.

Krishna, V.; Morgan, J. - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International … - 1999

degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663968

Cost Sharing in Collective Contests

Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - CESifo - 2014

This paper studies collective contests with endogenous cost sharing, general effort costs and intra-group heterogeneity of prize-valuation. Our objective is to clarify the relationship between cost sharing, intra-group heterogeneity within the competing groups and the elasticity of the marginal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877824

Scoring Rules over Subsets of Alternatives: Consistency and Paradoxes

Kamwa, Eric; Merlin, Vincent - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM) - 2014

We know since the works of Gehrlein and Fishburn (1980, 1981), Fishburn (1981) and Saari (1987, 1988, 1990) that, the collective rankings of scoring rules are not stable when some alternatives are dropped from the set of alternatives. However, in the literature, attention has been mainly devoted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934680

LOGICAL AND HISTORICAL DETERMINATION OF THE ARROW AND SEN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS

Boričić, Branislav - In: Economic Annals 52 (2007) 172, pp. 7-20

General classification of mathematical statements divides them into universal, those of the form ∀xA, and existential ones ∃xA. Common formulations of impossibility theorems of K. J. Arrow and A. K. Sen are represented by the statements of the form ‘there is no x such that A’. Bearing in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938619

IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREMS IN MULTIPLE VON WRIGHT’S PREFERENCE LOGIC

Boricic, Branislav - In: Economic Annals 59 (2014) 201, pp. 69-84

By using the standard combining logics technique (D. M. Gabbay 1999) we define a generalization of von Wright’s preference logic (G. H. von Wright 1963) enabling to express, on an almost propositional level, the individual and the social preference relations simultaneously. In this context we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938624

In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups

Harris, Donna; Abbink, Klaus - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self. Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members. The three groups are supporters of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004284

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