In this paper we show that a strict liability fine, established on the marginal damages caused by production act as a mean to discriminate between firms. More precisely, facing a potential risk, understood as a random negative externality, "ex ante" identical rival firms playing on a competitive...

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where firms are collusive in the first stage, and shows that oligopolists may have a strong incentive to redistribute resources (such as capital, pollution permits etc...) within the industry as a means of coordinating their output decision....

This paper considers a model of oligopolistic competition and locational choice that incorporates the notion of regional industrial systems. Firms play a non cooperative game where the strategy set of firms is given by a set of existing industrial districts. Each firm is distinguished by its...

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxees or input prices. In...

In a world where firms are oligopolists, is it possible to create a customs union that raises the welfare of member countries without hurting non-members countries? We give sufficient conditions for an affirmative answer.

We derive the characteristics of firm-specific trade policies when industries consist of heterogeneous firms, and show how the informational requirements for policy design are thereby expanded. A consideration of these informational requirements indicates that governments will confront...

Marshallian districts are locales that accomodate a large number of small firms producing similar goods to be exported and benefit from the accumulation of know-how associated with workers residing there. We study the making of such districts by assuming that the cost function of a firm is a...

This paper examines the stability of research joint venture when the success of innovative activities is uncertain. While an increase in the likelihood of making a discovery provides firms with an incentive to cooperate, there is a competing incentive to conduct R&D independently. Should the RJV...

A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patters emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two- dimensional plane is...