In this paper, we pursue several goals; we first check if the downward trend in corporate income tax rates in Europe reflects a strategy of tax competition, and not a "yardstick competition" in neighboring countries. We estimate the scale of fiscal externalities on neighboring countries in terms...

This paper contribtes to the small empirical literature dealing with strategic tax behaviors of small EU countries. We estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with each other. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg framework, we use panel...

The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we...

In this paper, we try to understand the economic policies choice of countries in terms of size. According to the case whether a country is large or small, it will have different incentives in the choice of its growth strategy. Theoretically, a large country would prefer use a policy which...

In this paper, we focus on the concept of size of country (or economy). Specifically, within the European Union (EU), we look for growth discrepancies between countries according to their size. We try to explain growth differential using arguments related to the size of countries. Thus, we...

This paper presents a diagrammatic survey of the standard neo-classical theory of tax competition for foreign direct investment and tax coordination between countries. It has four aims: to give a detailed view of the main theoretical and empirical results; to extract from it some general...

The very essence of both federal and unitary countries is multi-tiered governments. This architecture typically involves some commonality of tax bases between higher- and lower-level authorities. This process points to the existence of vertical externalities, i.e. of an inefficiently high degree...

Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition...

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

This paper studies the impact of a government's efficiency on the taxation policy of a state. Namely, we claim that the countries are different both in the way they tax capital and the way they spend the collected revenue. We build a model of 2 countries competing for foreign investment,...