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Limited Commitment, Inaction and Optimal Monetary Policy

Mirzoev, Tokhir - EconWPA - 2004

-announced schedule de facto acts as a commitment not to adjust in intermediate periods. We find that at short horizons gains from such … commitment outweigh welfare costs of central bank's inaction. Second, we solve for the optimal frequency of policy adjustment and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076774

Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and, because of verifiability problems, the transparency solution is not feasible. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497735

Monetary Policy Regimes and the Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates

Queijo von Heideken, Virginia - Sveriges Riksbank - 2008

This paper addresses two important questions that have, so far, been studied separately in the literature. First, the paper aims at explaining the high volatility of long-term interest rates observed in the data, which is hard to replicate using standard macro models. Building a small-scale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423759

Optimal Control and Filtering in Linear Forward-looking Economies: A Toolkit

Gerali, Andrea; Lippi, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We provide algorithms to solve a linear-quadratic optimal control problem with commitment. By extending to the case of … simulations, impulse response functions and other techniques, with both commitment and discretion. A monetary policy application …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661950

The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s

Belke, Ansgar; Freytag, Andreas; Keil, Jonas; … - In: International Review of Economics & Finance 33 (2014) C, pp. 217-227

and an institutional framework enforcing the commitment. We further propose a proxy variable for monetary credibility in … a correlation between monetary commitment to rules and price stability is relatively weak. We discuss likely causes for … this weak link and argue that monetary commitment is not necessarily credible by itself without adequate policy assignment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930983

Endogenous Monetary Policy in Macroeconomic Models: The Role of Commitment, Conservative Central Banker and Optimal Central Bank Contracts in the Credibility of Monetary Policy

Alajääskö, Pekka - Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus (VATT), Government … - 1996

consequence of strategic and informational interactions between policymakers and private sector individuals and institutions. It …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353550

Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence

Cukierman, Alex; Lippi, Francesco - Banca d'Italia - 1998

This paper proposes a conceptual framework that makes it possible to investigate the effects of central bank independence, the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and the interaction between those institutional variables on the real wage, unemployment and inflation. This is done by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111579

Is ECB Communication Effective?

Rosa, Carlo; Verga, Giovanni - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2005

In its Monthly Bulletin of November 2002, the European Central Bank (ECB) stated that the monthly press conference held by its President represents one of its most important communication channels and that it provides a comprehensive summary of the policy relevant assessment of economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797301

Estimating and Interpreting Forward Interest Rates: Sweden 1992-4

Svensson, Lars E O - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

The use of forward interest rates as a monetary policy indicator is demonstrated, using Sweden between 1992 and 1994 as an example. The forward rates are interpreted as indicating market expectations of the time-path of future interest rates, future inflation rates, and future currency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123801

Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence

Cukierman, Alex; Lippi, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence, of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables, on real wages, unemployment and inflation. The labour market is characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497748

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