This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games.  It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations.  In contrast to the global games literature, noise...

This paper shows that the price of a painting sold at an art auction and the experts' pre-sale valuations are anchored on the price at which the painting previously sold at auction. We are able to separate anchoring from rational learning by using the identifying strategy that the unobservable...

A model of a firm with one principal and two agents is considered. The actions of the agents are not observed by the principal; hence there is moral hazard. It is shown that when the agents act sequentially -- that is, agent 2 takes his action conditional upon agent 1's choice -- the first-best...

This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types.  It proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.  It also provides analyses of stability with respect to perturbations and dynamic...

This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making...

This paper considers a model of endogenous growth with two sectors. It shows that it may be desirable to concentrate research in one sector, and so have unbalanced growth, but that the pressure of competition in research may cause the private sector to spread research too widely, and so have...

This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several...

We analyse an infinite-period model of duopolistic competition in a market with consumer switching costs, in which in every period new consumers arrive and a fraction of old consumers leaves. We show that prices (and profits) are higher than in a market without switching costs, and that this...

This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potentital games.