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Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation

Ortega, Olaizola; Norma, María; Kuipers, Jerome - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, … - 2004

only known solution that satisfies core stability, strong aggegate monotonicity and null player out property in the class … of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364647

Silence is golden: communication, silence, and cartel stability

Basuchoudhary, Atin; Conlon, John R. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper studies how cartel stability is influenced by asymmetric information and communication about demand. Firms … its partners and another where it does not. We show that cartels are extremely unstable when the informed firm … communicates with the uninformed firms. However, when the informed firm does not communicate with the uninformed firms cartels can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110577

Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems

Ortega, Olaizola; Norma, María; García, Iñarra; … - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y … - 2001

The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present an approach and a solution for analyzing the stability of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518745

An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

Ortega, Olaizola; Norma, María - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, … - 2003

approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005518763

Inefficient centralization of imperfect complements

Gregor, Martin; Gregorová, Lenka - Institut ekonomických studií, Univerzita Karlova v Praze - 2007

If local public goods exhibit spillovers and regions are sufficiently symmetric, decentralization implies underprovision, whereas cooperative centralization is associated with strict Pareto-improvement. This classic inference rests on two assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698660

Delegation of Bargaining and Power

Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998

Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771176

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

Chari, V.V.; Jones, Larry E.; Marimon, Ramon - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2004

problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772045

Endogenous Market Structures and Contract Theory

Etro, Federico - Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e … - 2010

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern 1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540696

The Effects of Preference Characteristics and Overconfidence on Economic Incentives

Englmaier, Florian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

This dissertation is a collection of three independent research papers and three chapters with surveys introducing into the respective literature. The first paper analyses the effects of introducing Inequity Aversion in a Moral Hazard Problem, the second paper is about optimal delegation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520789

Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts

Kockesen, Levent; Gerratana, Emanuele - İktisat Bölümü, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi - 2009

It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of twostage games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528569