This paper studies the possibility of using auctions as a policy instrument in conservation programs. In particular, it provides insight into the main concerns that need to be dealt with when implementing conservation auctions. To show the cost saving potential of this policy instrument, we also...

This article studies the effects of informal, non-monetary sanctions, such as warnings, which are often used as an enforcement instrument by environmental inspection agencies. In cases of uncertainty with respect to the measured emissions due to measurement errors or accidental violations, some...

We build a structural model to understand the fine set in court, which is described as the outcome of a two-stage game between defendant, public prosecutor and judge. The equilibrium fine depends on the harm caused, the costs to society and the probalility that the quilty party is punished. This...

According to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: the...

Using an online survey, we have asked the researchers in the field of environmental and resource economics how they themselves would rank a representative list of journals in their field. The results of this ranking are then compared to the ordering based on the journals’ impact factors as...

Firms’ compliance decisions are expected to be strongly influenced by the expected fine for non-compliance with environmental regulations. In this paper we measure the effect of the probability of inspection and the size of the fine – jointly and separately – on the compliance decisions...

This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can...

This paper revisits the soft budget constraint problem, pushing sub-central (state) borrowing to the limit in multi-tiered countries. Accounting for the institutional design and political practice common to many federations, bargaining and log-rolling are introduced to the analysis. In our...

In this paper we optimize the regulation of an intersection of two routes connecting one origin-destination pair and study the effects of priority rules, traffic lights and tolls. We show that when the intersection is regulated by a priority rule the optimal policy is generally to block one of...