Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 10,331
Cover Image
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection
Blouin, Max R. - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 2, pp. 245-262
This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents), then all units of the good are traded, and all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597877
Cover Image
A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 163-186
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private … standard models of lemons markets, to being perfectly informative. We show that high quality units are sold with positive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025199
Cover Image
Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127
Cover Image
Prices and quality signals
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2004
We consider a market-for-lemons model where the seller is a price setter, and, in addition to observing the price, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649402
Cover Image
Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
Cover Image
Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention
Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John - Economics Discipline Group, Business School - 2013
well understood. What are the properties of equilibrium in dynamic markets for lemons? What determines the liquidity of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752839
Cover Image
Regulatory design under asymmetric information about demand
Sarmento, Paula; Brandão, António - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto - 2008
In this paper we compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator. Then, the incumbent firm can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005031561
Cover Image
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737648
Cover Image
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications
Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672484
Cover Image
Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
Camargo, Braz; Lester, Benjamin - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 534-568
We study a dynamic, decentralized lemons market with one-time entry and characterize its set of equilibria. Our …; given an initial fraction of lemons, our model delivers sharp predictions about the length of time it takes for the market … for asset-backed securities. We find that, depending on the fraction of lemons in the market, such an intervention can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042973