An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted for Soviet Russia assuming that it was the Gulag not unemployment that acted as a ‘worker-discipline device’. Archival data now available allows for a basic account of the dynamics of the Gulag to be estimated....

High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake...

Uruguay is a small economy. Its integration to MERCOSUR has increased the exposure to regional macroeconomic inestability. The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of regional integration on labour market and poverty. We estimated wage differentials between labour categories, finding a 60%...

We consider a segmented labor market characterized by a Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage setting in both sectors. However, the primary sector and the secondary sector differ in the firing cost which induces a wage diffential. We suppose also a heterogeneous labor force characterized by the...

This paper merges a cost-based model of union bargaining power, in which bargaining power reflects relative costs of agreement and disagreement facing unions and management, with an efficiency-wage model, in which effort per hour responds positively to the real wage. Union bargaining alters the...

La théorie du salaire d'efficience, développée par les "nouveaux keynésiens", s'inscrit dans un programme de recherche dont le but est d'expliquer le chômage "involontaire" dans le cadre de "l'équilibre général". Ces travaux constituent donc une tentative de synthèse des analyses...

By explicitly examining the symmetry assumption implicit in much of the efficiency wage literature, a plausible supply-side link between monetary policy and worker productivity is introduced. Specifically, if relative wages influence worker behavior asymmetrically and monetary policy alters...

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...