I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not...

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...

Economists model time as continuous or discrete. The recent literature on continuous time models with delays should help to bridge the gap between these two families of models. In this note, we propose a simple time–to–build model in continuous time, and show that a discrete time version is...

The objective of this study is to examine the relationships that exist among the attributions, the affect and behavioral intentions of consumers who suffer delays in services. As a new element, we propose to consider two emotional reactions: anger and dissatisfaction. The methodology employed is...

Alternating bargaining has been extensively used to model two-sidednegotiations. The celebrated model of Rubinstein (1982) has provided a formaljustification for equitable payoff division. A typical assumption of these models underrisk is that the breakdown event means a complete and irrevocable...