When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley’s aggregative...

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions...

Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But it has also been observed that, if no transfer payments are possible, the Lindahl equilibrium may not be Pareto-superior to the Nash outcome of the voluntary-contribution game. We derive...

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income...

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a...

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a...

In this paper, we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares in cooperative public good provision and the core property of Pareto-optimal allocations. Core allocations do not only fulfil an important stability condition but are also the only promising...

Handlungsempfehlungen (deutsch): Gegenseitigkeit und Vertrauen können in verschiedener Weise den Abschluss internationaler Klimaschutzvereinbarungen fördern: 1. Klimapolitische Instrumente sollten derart gestaltet werden, dass sie mit dem Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit („Reziprozität“)...

In this paper, we analyse how the prospect of international negotiations over transboundary pollution shapes intra-country transfer schemes when the governments of the countries' polluting regions are in charge of environmental policy and negotiations. Federal governments can implement...