Consider a homogeneous Stackelberg leader-follower duopoly with quantity competition, in which both firms face the same industry-wide marginal costs. This paper investigates the comparative static effects of a change in these marginal costs. We show that an increase of the costs will lead to a...

In the 16th century, foreign ships passing through the Sound had to pay ad valorem taxes, known as the Sound Dues. To give skippers an incentive to declare the true value of their cargo, the Danish Crown reserved the right to purchase it at the declared value. We show that this rule does not...

We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower managerial effort level that...

This paper presents a formal model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling shareholders shifting resources from one firm to another in the same pyramid. Propping is tunneling that is done to save the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We compare...

This paper is concerned with investigating the role of accounting practices in radical change processes. The institutional framework has been taken as a starting point in investigating these processes. The research has been carried out at the Dutch Railways. This company was forced by the Dutch...

This paper considers the degree of competitiveness of the Dutch consumer credit market. We use the well-known I Bresnahan-Lau method that estimates it structural model consisting of a demand relation and a supply relation, based on aggregate data. The level of compelition is derived from the...

After a theoretical overview of factors which could influence aldermen’s use of information, this paper presents some findings of survey research on 262 aldermen of 140 Dutch municipalities with 20,000 or more inhabitants. The findings of the survey indicate that many respondents considered...

We consider the following model. First, two firms choose locations on a Hotelling line. Second, they play a repeated price-setting game, in which they may be able to collude. Transportation costs are quadratic. We show that if firms collude in the location stage, they choose locations that...

In a model of price competition with a most-favored-customer clause we show that cost-change induced price adjustments are asymmetric. That is, the degree of price rigidity differs between increases and de-creases. With this policy one would expect firms to be reluctant to decrease prices...

The well-known Klein-Monti model of bank behavior considers a monopolistic bank. We demonstrate that this model’s results on the comparative static effects of a change in the exogenous interbank market interest rate do not necessarily hold in oligopolistic Cournot or Stackelberg...