This paper provides a synthesis of the theoretical literature on financial distress. It employs a two-state framework, which more clearly captures the generalizations of the more complex models. The equation systems that are derived permit the development of a series of examples that convey the...

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt’ thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory...

This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations on the bank's fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur...

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit con-tract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to...

This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors’ expectations of the bank’s fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur...

Using data from a Taiwanese finance company, this paper empirically investigates the value of soft information, information that requires the subjective interpretation by the loan officers who collect it and cannot be credibly transmitted to others, for making small business loans. It finds that...

This article examines the relationship between firm performance and its controlling shareholder's personal loans. We present a model that allows the controlling shareholder to finance company projects through personal loans. Using personal loans, however, will create an incentive for controlling...