In this study the structure-induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override. A multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors — a legislature,...

This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to...

This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five-stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors--a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive--is presented. The authors examine (1) the factors...

Statutory law and case law establish mandates with respect to discounting future sums and the treatment of taxes in cases of personal injury. The results presented herein concern the northeast states and have been distilled from a larger ongoing study of the 50 states in the US. The principal...

The field of forensic economics is described broadly. Examples are given of the kinds of cases in which forensic economists participate. Key features are presented concerning forensic economic analysis of personal injury and wrongful death cases.