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We consider an environment in which agents' skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal for an individual's marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so. This wedge is consistent with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005251262
We consider an environment in which agents' skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal for an individual's marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so. This wedge is consistent with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010637974
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708299
In this paper, we consider an environment in which agents’ skills are private information, are potentially multi-dimensional, and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We allow for arbitrary incentive-compatible and physically feasible tax schemes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005712324
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765430
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903532
We analyze a dynamic stochastic general‐equilibrium (DSGE) model with an externality—through climate change—from using fossil energy. Our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions (or, equivalently, for the optimal carbon tax). This formula, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011006217
We study the optimal Mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy with idiosyncratic (productivity or preference) shocks. In contrast to the standard approach, which implicitly assumes that the mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power, we assume that any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079182
This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448
The paper analyzes an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The problem is modeled as a dynamic mechanism design problem in which disability is unobservable. We show that an asset-tested disability system in which a disability transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025621