We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

The Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependant utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) area better predictor...

It is generally agreed that the minimax solution to a two-person zero-sum matrix game is intuitively satisfactory. Now in many applications of game theory, a game is not described a priori in matrix (or "normal" or "strategic") form, but rather in extensive form, i.e., by its rules. A game...

The extended Chinese postman (CP) enterprize is induced by a connected and undirected graph G. A server is located at some fixed vertex of G, to be referred to as the post office. Each player resides in a single edge, and each edge contains at most one player. Thus, some of the edges can be...