We use a simple version of the Psychological Expected Utility Model (Caplin and Leahy, QJE, 2001) to analyze the optimal choice of information accuracy by an individual who is concerned with anticipatory feeling. The individual faces the following trade-off: on the one hand information may lead...

Two ingredients seem essential in understanding the patient-physician relationship: (i) the physician's informational advantage and (ii) the relevance of the patient's emotions. Health economics has placed great emphasis on the first phenomenon, whereas the second has been considered only...

In many instances where public policy concerning externalities is considered, ensuring an adequate perception of the public is not less important than setting ideal taxes. We show however that public authorities are typically incited to deliver biased information (exaggeration or attenuation) to...

The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed than the government on the effect of their consumption. The policy making process is analyzed as a game in which the government wants to influence consumers' behaviors through tax policy, consumers being rational and...

This paper investigates banks’ corporate social responsibility. Two different competitive credit markets do exist: one for standard projects and one for ethical ones. Ethical projects have also a social profitability, but a lower (positive) expected revenue with respect to standard ones....

"We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal" "using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for...