In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...

We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

In exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad [Doghmi, A., Ziad, A., 2008-this issue. Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability. Economics Letters.], (2) strict monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin...

An agent is said to be partially honest if he or she weakly prefers an outcome at a strategy profile with his truthful strategy than an outcome at a strategy profile with his false strategy, then this player must prefer strictly the \true" strategy profille to the \false" strategy profile. In...

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs)...

Abstract: In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing new sufficient conditions called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. Firstly, we show that these conditions together with unanimity are sufficient for the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCCs)...

In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing two new properties called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. These properties form together with unanimity a new sufficient condition for a social choice correspondence to be implementable in Nash equilibria with at...

Being a "jack-of-all-trades" increases the probability of running an entrepreneurial venture successfully; but what happens to "jack-of-few-trades" who lack sufficient skills? This paper investigates a possible compensation mechanism between balanced skills and cities, and how this compensatory...

Often, a person will become an entrepreneur only after a period of dependent employment, suggesting that occupational choices precede entrepreneurial choices. We investigate the relationship between occupational choice and self-employment. The findings suggest that the occupational choice of...

We investigate the role of industry and region-specific conditions for the survival of new businesses in innovative and in other manufacturing industries. The data comprises all German manufacturing start-ups of the 1992 to 2005 period. In contrast to studies for some other countries, we find...