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In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512520
In exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad [Doghmi, A., Ziad, A., 2008-this issue. Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability. Economics Letters.], (2) strict monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005355543
We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005361701
Abstract: In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing new sufficient conditions called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. Firstly, we show that these conditions together with unanimity are sufficient for the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCCs)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167026
In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing two new properties called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. These properties form together with unanimity a new sufficient condition for a social choice correspondence to be implementable in Nash equilibria with at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011191142
In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605351
An agent is said to be partially honest if he or she weakly prefers an outcome at a strategy profile with his truthful strategy than an outcome at a strategy profile with his false strategy, then this player must prefer strictly the \true" strategy profille to the \false" strategy profile. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009393786
In a mixed-model assembly line dierent models of a common base product can be manufactured in intermixed production sequences. A famous solution approach for the resulting short-term sequencing problem is the so called level scheduling problem, which aims at evenly smoothing the material...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835230
Seit Anfang der 90er Jahre gewinnt die graphische Modellierung abhängigkeitsanalytischer Modelle an Bedeutung. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich zunächst den Grundzügen der Abhängigkeitsanalyse, wobei wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretische Grundlagen und axiomatische Darstellungen von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835231
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835232