By considering lifetime uncertainty, this paper employs an OLG model within general equilibrium framework to analyze China’s urban public pension system. Using the condition for the steady-state of market economy to satisfy the social welfare maximization, we solve the optimal social pool...

It has been shown in economic research that public pay-as-you-go defined-benefit pension plans penalize those who continue to work beyond a certain age by reducing the present discounted value of future retirement benefits. In discussions on the effectiveness of policies aimed at eliminating...

Blanchard’s (1985) model is modified to build an OLG model with an increasing probability of death, endogenous growth and a bequest motive. The motivation is to obtain a more rich, realistic and flexible framework to reproduce -using numerical methods- some stylised facts of the age-profiles...

Why do people have kids in developed societies? We propose an empirical test of two alternative theories — children as “consumption” vs. “investment” good. We use as a natural experiment the Italian pension reforms of the 90s that introduced a clear discontinuity in the treatment...

The emergence of old-age social security has been linked to general fertility decline, and in recent years pension reforms have emerged as a response to the challenges of population ageing, in turn partially a consequence of fertility decline. Understanding the link between social security and...

Human capital and, therefore, education have an impact on the societys future welfare. In this paper we study the connection between the voters support to public education and the retirement concerns. We show that voters anticipate the positive effect of education on future pensions. The support...

Public services provision depends on tax proceeds. The tax rate to finance public school is chosen through majority voting. Under the monotonicity condition implying that the preferred tax rate is decreasing in income, the literature predicts that the median voter is decisive and poor agents...