I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the...

Obtaining information about changes in market conditions is vital for the survival of the firms operating in a changing environment. In this paper, we offer a theory of information flows in a setting in which the principal faces a project choice and needs to induce the agent, who is responsible...

Public service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the...

Public service motivation is often considered as an argument for low- powered incentive schemes in the public sector. In this paper, we characterize the optimal contract between a public regulator and an altruistic agent according to the degree of public service motivation, when the type of the...

A tanulmány a hálózatos szolgáltatások összekapcsolási díjának szabályozásával foglalkozik. A hálózatmegosztás és feltételeinek szabályozása a közszolgáltatások szabályozásának egyik legfontosabb problémája. Az összekapcsolási díj szabályozásának e cikkben...

The rents agents can extract from principals increase with the magnitude of incentive problems, which the literature usually takes as given. We endogenize it, by allowing agents to choose technologies that are more or less opaque and correspondingly prone to agency problems. In our overlapping...

L’information est au cœur du processus d’intermédiation financière. Pourtant, la manière dont les décisionnaires de la banque utilisent et interprètent l’information dans le processus d’octroi de crédit demeure une boîte noire. A partir d’une analyse statistique textuelle...

Time-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate endogenous crises when the government cannot commit. However, at the outbreak of financial problems, usually the government is uncertain about their nature, and hence it may delay...

We model religious faith as a "demand for beliefs," following the logic of the Pascalian wager. We then demonstrate how an experimental intervention can exploit standard elicitation techniques to measure religious belief by varying prizes associated with making choices contrary to one's belief...

In his elegant book Douglas Allen claims that an improvement in the measurement of Nature made for lower transaction costs and the Industrial Revolution. His argument is a typical example of neo-institutionalism in the style of Douglass North (<CitationRef CitationID="CR14">1990</CitationRef>) and North et al. (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2009</CitationRef>). A fall in a wedge of...</citationref></citationref>