Fixed point theorems are the standard tool used to prove the existence of equilibria in mathematical economics. This paper shows how to prove a slight generalization of Brouwer's and Kakutani's fixed point theorems using the familiar techniques of drawing and shifting curves in the plane and is,...

Der Preisanpassungsprozess im Oligopol wird untersucht. Unter recht allgemeinen Voraussetzungen an die (lineare) Preis-Nachfrage-Funktionen der Akteure werden verschiedene Strategien diskutiert, wie z. B. die klassische Cournot-Nash-Lösung, die Launhardt-Hotelling-Strategie, die Stackelbergsche...

This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two-party electoral competition game when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous payoffs, this game,...

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and...

<p><p>We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results...</p></p>

We consider customer joining behaviour for a system that consists of a FCFS queue with Bernoulli feedback. A consequence of the feedback characteristic is that the sojourn time of a customer already in the system depends on the joining decisions taken by future arrivals to the system. By...

We present a two-firm model of predation under complete information, based on different discount factors, and integrate it with a model of collusion. Competition, collusion and predation are seen as alternative strategies. The basic conclusions are that t

Answering to an open question of Herings et al. (see [3]), one extends their fixed point theorem to mappings defined on convex compact subset of Rn, and not only polytopes. Such extension is important in non-cooperative game theory, where typical strategy sets are convex and compact. An...

In this paper, we present a more simple and independent proof of Reny's theorem (1998), on the existence of a Nash equilibrium in discontinue game, with a better-reply secure game in a Hausdorff topological vector space stronger than Reny's one. We will get the equivalence if the payoff function...

Properties of an average voting rule - the outcome being some weighted average of votes – are investigated, with particular attention to its ability to protect minorities. The unique average voting outcome is characterized with a median formula which depends on the voters’ preferred...