This paper examines optimal reorganization strategies during financial distress and securities valuation under asymmetric information. We model strategic interactions between debtholders and equityholders in a game-theoretic setting that can accommodate the varying bargaining powers of the two...

This paper examines optimal debt reorganization strategies in the presence of agency problems arising from information asymmetry between a firm and a bank during financial distress. In particular, in the structural model, we incorporate complete verification strategies for private information...

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings...

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage. We find that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the first mover, although the leader may exit before the followerfs entry. We also see the leverage effects of debt financing increasing...

This paper examines research and development (R&D) investment spillovers across different market structures. In particular, we extend the recent work in Matsumura et al. (2013) to incorporate R&D investment spillovers. When the market is a duopoly, noncooperative (cooperative) R&D investment is...

This paper examines investment timing by the manager in a decentralized firm in the presence of asymmetric information. In particular, we incorporate an audit technology in the agency model developed by Grenadier and Wang [2005. Investment timing, agency, and information. Journal of Financial...

This paper investigates a principal-agent model in which an owner (principal) optimizes a contract with a manager (agent) who has been delegated to undertake an investment project. In the model, we explore the effects of costly exploration by which the manager learns the real value of...

In this paper, we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage. We find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under...

This paper investigates a principal-agent model in which an owner (principal) optimizes a contract with a manager (agent) delegated to undertake an investment project. In the model, we explore the effects of costly exploration by which the manager learns the real value of development cost. We...