This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population...

This paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strategy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy...

We model and solve best choice problems in the multiple prior framework: An ambiguity averse decision maker aims to choose the best among a fixed number of applicants that appear sequentially in a random order. The agent faces ambiguity about the probability that a candidate—a relatively top...

We study a dynamic and infinite{dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences. In interior efficient allocations, agents share a common risk{adjusted prior and subjective interest rate. Interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with subjective...

We study a dynamic and in nite{dimensional model with Knightian uncertainty modeled by incomplete multiple prior preferences. In in- terior e cient allocations, agents share a common risk{adjusted prior and use the same subjective interest rate. Interior e cient alloca- tions and equilibria...

We prove that in smooth Markovian continuous-time economies with potentially complete asset markets, Radner equilibria with endogenously complete markets exist.

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

In infinite horizon economies only local equivalence of beliefs is needed to ensure the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. In fact, agents can even disagree completely in the long run in the sense that asymptotically, their beliefs are singular.