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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005017490
In dieser Studie werden anhand einer experimentellen Datenerhebung im Rahmen der deutschen Längsschnittstudie Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) mögliche Determinanten des Belohnungsaufschubs im Alter von fünf bis sechs Jahren untersucht (im Folgenden als "Geduld bei Kindern" bezeichnet)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500716
Geduld als Basis für Lebenserfolg ist nicht nur eine Frage der Biologie und Vererbung, sondern die Eltern-Kind-Interaktion und frühkindliche Sozialisation, scheint auch im Bereich der Zeitpräferenz die „Wiege des Handelns“ zu sein. In der vorliegenden Studie werden anhand einer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021851
Countercyclical risk aversion can explain major puzzles such as the high volatility of asset prices. Evidence for its existence is, however, scarce because of the host of factors that simultaneously change during financial cycles. We circumvent these problems by priming financial professionals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156799
A key ingredient of many popular asset pricing models is that investors exhibit countercyclical risk aversion, which helps explain major economic puzzles such as the strong and systematic variation in risk premiums over time and the high volatility of asset prices. There is, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240398
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988959
High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019483
In Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort, and (iv)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019648
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951, Econometrica, 19, 293-302), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019656
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210865