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Managing the Dilemma of Discretion: The European Commission and the Development of EU State Aid Policy
Doleys, Thomas - In: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 13 (2013) 1, pp. 23-38
This article examines the role played by the European Commission in the development of the European Union’s (EU) state aid policy. It does so through the prism of a “dilemma” that exists at the nexus of the Commission’s delegated authority to administer EU treaty state aid provisions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988925
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Shifting the blame to a powerless intermediary
Oexl, Regine; Grossman, Zachary - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 3, pp. 306-312
We extend the results of Bartling and Fischbacher (Rev. Econ. Stud. 79(1):67–87, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2012</CitationRef>) by showing that, by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift blame onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988979
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Delegation vs. Control of Component Procurement Under Asymmetric Cost Information and Simple Contracts
Kayis, Enis; Erhun, Feryal; Plambeck, Erica L. - In: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15 (2013) 1, pp. 45-56
-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected profit for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990420
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Reputation from nested activities
Ordoñez, Guillermo - In: Economic Theory 52 (2013) 3, pp. 915-940
Principals usually try to elicit the quality and behavior of agents from their performance. While sometimes success or failure in production does not provide accurate information about the agents, there may be activities not directly related to production that constitute a more precise signal. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993630
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Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements
Vabulas, Felicity; Snidal, Duncan - In: The Review of International Organizations 8 (2013) 2, pp. 193-220
The renaissance in the theoretical analysis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has focused on formal IGOs (FIGOs), but many IGOs are subject to no formal treaty and/or have no permanent secretariat. Important examples of informal IGOs (IIGOs) include the G-groups that are the locus of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848811
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Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending
Basso, Henrique S.; Costain, James - Banco de España - 2013
This paper studies the effects of delegating control of sovereign debt issuance to an independent authority in a monetary union where public spending decisions are decentralized. The model assumes that no policy makers are capable of commitment to a rule. However, consistent with Rogoff (1985)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862269
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Social Comparisons in Wage Delegation: Experimental Evidence
Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Lacomba, Juan A.; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884248
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Communication in bargaining over decision rights
Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 159-179
This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906690
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Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 289-305
In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906694
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Trust, Firm Organization and the Structure of Production
Cingano, Federico; Pinotti, Paolo - "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social … - 2012
Interpersonal trust favors the expansion of organizations by allowing the delegation of decisions and tasks among … manufacturing firms and use this source of data to construct an industry-specific measure of need-for-delegation in production. We … export shares in delegation-intensive industries relative to other industries. Such effects are associated with an increase …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907189