The issue of the order dependence of iterative deletion procedures is well known in the game theory community, and conditions on the dominance concept underlying these procedures have meanwhile been detected which ensure order independence (see, e.g., the criteria of Gilboa et al. (1990) and Apt...

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic...

An economy consists of many duopolistic markets. Firms must earn normal profits in the long run if they are to survive. Normal profits are interpreted as the long-run limit of average profits in the whole economy. We adopt the aspiration based model of firm behaviour, and link it to the economy...

When Argentine sovereign default in December 2001 led to a collapse of the peso, the burden of dollar debt became demonstrably unsustainable. But it was not clear what restructuring was feasible, nor when. Eventually, in 2005 after a delay of more than three years, a supermajority of creditors...

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

What are the equilibrium features of a financial market where a sizeable proportion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our understanding of financial markets, which are increasingly dominated by institutional investors. We construct a model of delegated portfolio...

How can we count and list all the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index of power configurations for a given number of players? There is no formula in the literature that may give the cardinal of such a set, and moreover, even if this formula had existed, there is no formula which gives the...

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining...