This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in...

This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and studies both quantity-setting competition and price-setting competition. We consider a lifetime-employment-contract policy as a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve. Furthermore,...

This paper examines a continuous-time mixed model of the strategic investment decisions of a labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm in a new mixed market and constructs a set of perfect equilibria of the continuous-time mixed model. The paper shows that...

This paper examines the behavior of a labor-managed income-per-member-maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm in a quantity-setting model with a strategic commitment. First, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity. This capacity may subsequently be...

This paper is based on a two-stage model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. We consider two cases in terms of strategic relevance between both firms. We also consider both price-setting competition and quantitysetting competition. Therefore, we examine four cases. Each case is...

The analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) discusses the perfect equilibria of a continuous-time model of the strategic investment decisions of two profitmaximizing private firms in a new market and suggests that there are perfect equilibria where each firm does not invest to its steady-state...

This paper considers a two-stage quantity-setting duopoly model. The paper classifies demand functions into the following four cases in terms of the goods relevance and strategic relevance between both firms: ‘substitute goods and strategic substitutes’, ‘substitute goods and strategic...

This paper considers a two-period model in which two labour-managed firms can use inventory investment as a strategic device. In the first period, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses how much it sells in the current market and the level of inventory it holds for the second-period...

This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a labour-managed firm. In the first production period, the state-owned and labour-managed firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. The chosen outputs become common knowledge and then, in...