initiate corruption actively, in order to assess the full effect of whistle-blowing. In our laboratory experiment we find that …Whistle-blowing is seen as a powerful tool in containing corruption, although theoretical findings and experimental … the effect of symmetrically punished whistle-blowing is ambiguous since it reduces the impact of corruption on productive …

theoretical and empirical justification. We show in a laboratory experiment using a standard corruption game that introducing the …The ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’ is considered as one of the most potent measures against corruption although it lacks both …

We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of … public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as … businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is …

punishment. However, neither option is without cost. What is the tradeoff between these strategies? In this study, we introduce … an exogenous punishment mechanism that varies the probability and magnitude of punishment to examine this tradeoff. In … our punishment system, sanctions are imposed on the lowest contributor according to a predetermined probability rather …

second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning depend on the treatment: whereas punishment can reduce inequality in one … treatment, it only creates another inequality in the other. To capture the effect of delay on punishment both treatments are run … once with immediate and once with delayed punishment. Moreover, to investigate the effect of pure voice, all four …

investigation of individual versus group decision making in a corruption experiment. We find that the group decisions, as compared …Much hope is put into the ‘‘four eyes principle’’ as an anti corruption device in many countries. However, as recent … to individual decisions, lead to a higher level of corruption, for bribers and for bribees, and in China as well as in …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … setting reduces corruption. …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption. …