The German system of financial equalization among the country’s 16 federal states is built into a cooperative game. In this game, pairs of disjoint coalitions of players may form alliances which harmonize tax revenues among its members according to the procedural regulations of the law. The...

If carbon capture and storage (CCS) is to become a viable option for low-carbon power generation, its deployment will require the construction of dedicated CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> transport infrastructure. In a scenario of large-scale deployment of CCS in Europe by 2050, the optimal (cost-minimising)...</subscript></subscript>

This paper provides a quantitative metric for financial stability of Korean commercial banking system based on the Tsomocos (J Math Econ 39(5–6):619–655, <CitationRef CitationID="CR32">2003</CitationRef>) model, for which we use market data as proxies for probabilities of default and equity valuation of the banking sector. We estimate...</citationref>

In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2003</CitationRef>), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang...</citationref>

Time series of coalitions (so-called scenarios) are studied that describe processes of coalition formation where several players may enter or leave the current coalition at any point in (discrete) time and convergence to the grand coalition is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one...

In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014