This note presents an algorithm that extends a binary choice model to choice among multiple alternatives. Both neoclassical microeconomic theory and Luce choice model are consistent with the proposed algorithm. The algorithm is compatible with several empirical findings (asymmetric dominance and...

This paper investigates how subjects determine minimum selling prices for lotteries. We design an experiment where subjects have at every moment an incentive to state their minimum selling price and to adjust the price if they believe that the price that they stated initially was not optimal. We...

This note presents an algorithm that extends a binary choice model to choice among multiple alternatives. Both neoclassical microeconomic theory and Luce choice model are consistent with the proposed algorithm. The algorithm is compatible with several empirical findings (asymmetric dominance and...

Risk aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of risk aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they...

The conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.

This paper analyzes risk aversion when outcomes/consequences may not be measurable in monetary terms and people have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e. they choose in a probabilistic manner. The paper shows that comparative risk aversion is well defined in a constant error/tremble model...

Empirical research often requires a method how to convert a deterministic economic theory into an econometric model. A popular method is to add a random error term on the utility scale. This method, however, violates stochastic dominance. A modification of this method is proposed to avoid...

In three binary choice problems, people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories. This new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected...

In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L1 to lottery L2 when the probability that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than the probability that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be rationalized by three standard...