In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

This discussion paper led to an article in the <I>European Economic Review</I> (2014). Vol. 71(October), pages 1-14.<P> This paper assesses the effects of changes in scoring weights in auctions, using a unique sample of biddings of private Welfare-to-Work (WTW) organizations to reintegrate groups of...</p></i>

This paper assesses the effects of changes in scoring weights in auctions, using a unique sample of biddings of private Welfare-to-Work (WTW) organizations to reintegrate groups of unemployed and disabled workers. WTW-organizations did not only bid on prices, but also received points for three...

This paper assesses the effects of changes in scoring weights in auctions, using a unique sample of bids from private Welfare-to-Work (WTW) service providers to reintegrate groups of unemployed and disabled workers. These providers received points for their price bids and for three proxies of...

Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, subjects choose between a ‘public firm’ and a ‘private firm’ with team and individual incentives,...

Tight oligopolies are oligopolies the market characteristics of which facilitate the realisation of supranormal profits for a substantial period of time. We entangle the link between market structure and the possibility of welfare reducing behaviour by firms. A useful distinction can be made...

Pleas for a level playing field, for instance in international trade, are often not well-founded. This is because it is not exactly clear what a 'level playing field' means. But even if it would be clear what the plea would imply, a level playing field is not always desirable from an economic...

This paper applies the theory of auctioning incentive contracts to welfare-to-work programs. In several countries, the government procures welfare-to-work projects to employment service providers. In doing so, the government trades off adverse selection (the winning provider is not the most...

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz et al. (Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent, Working paper, University of Amsterdam <CitationRef CitationID="CR18">2012a</CitationRef>). ACDC...</citationref>