We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. <p …

Do politicians tend to follow a strategy of ambiguity in their policy positions or a strategy of reputational … a theory that considers conditions under which a politician would and would not prefer reputational development and …

Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower … politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House …

, politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics, I identify and discuss some of the salient questions that have …

political competition affects the quality of elected politicians, as measured by using some ex-ante characteristics such as …

their performance? Using public choice and institutional economics theory this paper analyses what chances of success PPPs …

bargaining theory. We find a substantial institutional status quo bias, which can contribute to explain the current delays in …