Rational herd behavior and informationally efficient security prices have long been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we describe conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary and sufficient for informational herding. Employing a...

While herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts, theoretical analyses have struggled to identify conclusive causes for the effect. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible in a market with efficient asset prices if information...

We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate nontrivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow (i.e., the order...

As equity trading becomes predominantly electronic, is there still value to a traditional, intermediated dealer system? We address this question by comparing the impact of the organization of trading on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency in a quote-driven dealer market and in an...

In a dynamic model of financial market trading multiple heterogeneously informed traders choose when to place orders. Better informed traders trade immediately, worse informed delay – even though they expect the market to move against them. This behavior generates intraday patterns with...

We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow, i.e. the order...

We undertook the first market trading experiments that allowed heterogeneously informed subjects to trade in endogenous time, collecting over 2000 observed trades. Subjects’ decisions were generally in line with the predictions of exogenous-time financial herding theory when that theory is...

There are two varieties of timing games in economics: In a war of attrition, more predecessors helps; in a pre-emption game, more predecessors hurts. In this paper, we introduce and explore a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both as special cases. In this environment with...

I formulate a stylized Glosten-Milgrom model of financial market trading in which people are allowed to time their trading decision. The focus of the analysis is to understand people’s timing behavior and how it affects bid- and offer-prices and volume. Assuming heterogeneous quality of...