We examine the behaviors of one state-owned welfare-maximizing firm and one labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing firm in a two-stage mixed market model with capacity investment as a strategic instrument. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to install...

This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity....

This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a labour-managed firm. In the first production period, the state-owned and labour-managed firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. The chosen outputs become common knowledge and then, in...

This paper examines the effect of salvage market on strategic technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage firms choose their production...

This paper examines a two-period mixed market model in which a welfaremaximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can use inventory investment as a strategic device. It is then demonstrated that the equilibrium in the second period coincides with the Stackelberg solution where...

Economists have suggested that the quality of higher education is not independent of the sources of funds used to fund that education. This paper examines the relationship between student measures of teaching quality and institutional revenue sources. The results indicate that a greater reliance...

Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the 'dynamic vitality' of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s...

Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of commiting to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entreperneur. We derive conditions under which completely...